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Abstract
Property rights are commonly touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. But in practice the
security of these property rights varies substantially owing to di￿erences in design. In ￿sheries, the design of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) varies widely; the consequences of these design di￿erences on economic
outcomes has not been studied. To test whether the security of these property rights a￿ects asset values,
we compile a unique dataset to examine the relationship between the exclusivity of property rights and the
dividend price ratios for ITQs. We ￿nd evidence that stronger property rights lead to higher asset values and
lower dividend price ratios in ITQ ￿sheries. This pecuniary e￿ect of property rights security informs the current
policy debate on the design of property rights institutions for managing natural resources.
1 Introduction
Property rights and institutions are believed to have a profound impact on investment and economic growth. Yet
it is di￿cult to empirically disentangle the e￿ects of institutions on economic outcomes. Case studies in a handful
of settings suggest the critical role of institutions, often in the context of developing countries (see, e.g. Acemoglu
and Johnson, 2005; Besley and Burgess, 2000, Alston et al., 1996; Alston and Mueller, 2010; Banerjee et al., 2002;
Besley, 1995; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Jacoby et al., 2002). Yet a key insight from early economic analysis, and
the focus of our analysis, regards instituting property rights over previously unowned natural resources and how
that might mitigate the ill consequences of the common pool. This paper contributes to this broader literature by
examining the e￿ect of stronger property rights on investment in common pool resources.
To overcome the problems pervasive in common pool resources (e.g. Gordon, 1954), rights-based management
approaches are increasingly employed globally. Strong evidence of increased economic and ecological performance
from rights-based approaches has emerged (Grafton et al., 2000; Costello et al., 2008), and the policy debate has
shifted away from ‘whether’ these approaches are e￿ective and toward questions of design. Many design elements
are likely to a￿ect the security of a property right. For example, so-called ￿sunset clauses￿ after which rights are
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1revoked and redistributed will a￿ect stewardship and value (Costello and Ka￿ne, 2008) and assignment of rights to
only a portion of the resource stock may erode conservation and investment incentives (Deacon et al., 2010). Other
fundamental design parameters include limits on ownership or transferability (Grafton et al., 2000), revocability,
and geographic or temporal control over resource stocks. Despite their ubiquity and importance for design, the
extent to which these limitations on property rights security a￿ect behavior and economic value has not been
carefully studied. The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the e￿ect of property rights security on asset
values of a globally signi￿cant common pool resource.
In ￿sheries, where the common pool feature has lead to widespread collapse (e.g. Worm et al., 2006), there is a
signi￿cant trend toward property rights-based approaches. Fisheries in developed countries have largely transitioned
from open access to limited entry, where the number of vessels is restricted, and often an overall quota is set for
all licensed ￿shermen. Under such management, resource rents may still be dissipated in the race to ￿sh and
overcapitalization (Homans and Wilen, 1997). In an attempt to allow the capture of resource rents, some ￿sheries
have adopted catch shares or other rights-based management.
In this paper, we focus our analysis exclusively on Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) ￿sheries. ITQs, a form
of ‘catch shares’, are the most prevalent form of ￿shery property right in the industrialized world, where the holder
of an ITQ owns an asset which confers the right to harvest a share of the total allowable catch in the present year
and into the future. ITQs have been hailed by economists as a means to capture the rents in ￿sheries. But in
practice, the design of ITQ systems varies signi￿cantly across ￿sheries; these design idiosyncracies a￿ect property
rights security in complex ways.
Under ITQ management, shares of the total allowable catch (TAC) are allocated to individuals (or ￿rms or
cooperatives), who then hold the right to harvest their share each year. Typically, the holder of an ITQ can exercise
that harvest right, lease it to another ￿sherman, or sell it. This has been shown to help achieve allocative and
technical e￿ciency (Grafton et al, 2000), which adds signi￿cant value in a ￿shery. In addition to eliminating the
￿race to ￿sh,￿ ITQ management has been shown to reverse the collapse of ￿sheries (Costello et al, 2008).
Since the introduction of the ￿rst ITQs in the mid-1980s in Iceland and New Zealand, ITQ ￿sheries have been
established in many countries (prominently the United States, Canada, Peru, Chile, and Australia). The general
structure of ITQ management has been adopted widely, but ITQs as property rights are viewed very di￿erently by
governments around the world. In New Zealand, ITQs are viewed as perpetual rights to ￿sh. There, a quota is a
2legal asset whose owner can use as collateral in establishing credit with banks. On the other hand, in Canada and
the United States ITQ ownership is considered a revocable privelege, and the future of ITQ property rights (at
least in the long run) is uncertain.
There is also important variation in the security of property rights within countries. Beyond di￿erences in design
features, some stocks are prone to signi￿cant illegal harvest due to high enforcement costs, while highly migratory
species are subject to harvest by neighboring jurisdictions or in international waters. Ownership of quota shares in
these stocks is arguably less secure than stocks with good enforcement and/or species that stay within the waters
of the managing jurisdiction.
This story is not unique to ￿sheries. The deleterious consequences of common pool management of resources
such as timber, air, water, and biodiversity are increasingly realized. These declines have lead to the establishment
of property rights over these resources. In so doing, governments inevitably wrestle with the dilemma of how
much control to cede to private resource owners, where more control confers a stronger property right to its owner.
Economic theory suggests that the strength of property rights should a￿ect the value of the asset itself (in ￿sheries,
this is the quota value) but should not a￿ect the current lease value. The lease value simply re￿ects the current
year’s rents, whereas the sales price of a quota should in principle capitalize future expectations. Quota markets
o￿er a good opportunity to study the e￿ect of more secure property rights on asset values because the relationship
between lease prices and sales prices of quota shares should be dictated by market fundamentals. Newell et al
(2005) study ITQ markets in New Zealand and ￿nd that markets are su￿ciently ￿thick￿ to operate well; the
relationship between lease and sales prices approximately follows market interest rates, and asset values in ￿sheries
that experienced signi￿cant rebuilding showed large gains. In a follow-up paper, Newell et al (2007) extend this
analysis to a more formal model of asset pricing. They ￿nd that asset prices are higher when interest rates are
lower, and asset values are lower for stocks with higher biological ￿uctuation. They also ￿nd that stocks that
had large decreases in costs or high growth rates in output prices have higher quota asset prices. These papers
contribute signi￿cantly to our understanding of quota markets and asset pricing in ￿sheries, though they do not
address the issue of property rights security.
In this paper we exploit di￿erences in property rights across countries to determine the market implications
of secure ownership of these assets. We then exploit variation in the exclusivity of the property right within
New Zealand to determine the impact of more secure property rights on the dividend price ratio, a measure of
3the implied discount rate in asset markets. We ￿nd that property rights security has a signi￿cant e￿ect on asset
values in ￿sheries suggesting that property rights security may have a profound impact on economic behavior in
(previously) common pool resources.
2 Background
ITQs allow the capture of resource rents by reducing the race to ￿sh and allowing the price mechanism to move
harvest rights to the most e￿cient ￿shermen. There is, however, considerable variation both across and within
countries in the strength of the property rights underlying these assets.
Every country imposes idiosyncratic limitations on trades, duration, and use of ITQ shares, including (but
not limited to) caps on ownership of shares, restrictions on ownership by foreign ￿eets, vessel capacity or gear
restrictions, and sunset provisions. Rather than modeling structurally the independent and combined e￿ects of
these restrictions,1 we will take a reduced form approach and leverage the fact that the ITQ asset price should
capitalize this array of limitations and restrictions. By calculating the dividend price ratio in each ￿shery over
time, we are able to test whether property rights security a￿ects investment in these assets.
Experience with ITQ management varies widely, beginning with New Zealand as an early adopter in 1986.
Species have been subsequently added to New Zealand’s Quota Management System over the past two decades,
and there are currently 98 species (or species groups) under quota management, with 690 separate management
stocks.
North America has taken a more cautious approach toward ITQ adoption. Canada’s Paci￿c Sable￿sh and
Halibut ITQs were introduced in 1990, and the United States implemented its ￿rst ITQ program in the mid-
Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog ￿shery in the same year. Since the introduction of the ￿rst ITQs, several
stocks have been added in the United States and Canada; the ￿sheries included in the analysis are listed in Table 1.
While the general principle behind ITQs is the same in these countries, the governments have very di￿erent legal
de￿nitions of the quota share held by individuals; these imply palpable di￿erences in property rights security. 2
1 Arnason de￿nes what he calls a ￿Q-Value￿, which is a measure of the quality (or strength) of property rights in
￿sheries. The Q-Value is a weighted index of assigned values for exclusivity, security, durability, and transferability,
but in the current empirical setting the practical use of this index has limitations. Use of the Q-Value requires
assigning values to each stick in the bundle for an individual country, and creating a weighted index of these scores
to come up with an overall score for the property rights strength.
2 Prominent papers examining the e￿ects of property rights on resource use include Watts and LaFrance (1994)
and Libecap (1981) who look at grazing permits; Rucker, Thurman and Sumner (1995) who examine agricultural
quota transfers; and Johnson, Gisser, and Werner (1981) who focus on water rights transfers in the Western United
4Table 1: US and Canadian ITQ Fisheries in the Analysis
Country Species Area First Year First Year
Under ITQ With Data
USA Halibut Alaska 1995 1995
USA Sable￿sh Alaska 1995 1995
USA Red Snapper Gulf of Mexico 2007 2007
USA Striped Bass Virginia 1998 2008
Canada Sable￿sh B.C. 1990 1996
Canada Halibut B.C. 1990 1996
Canada Ground￿sh (uncut) B.C. 1997 1999
Canada Arrowtooth Flounder B.C. 1997 2006
Canada Coastwide Hake B.C. 1997 1997
Canada Gulf Hake B.C. 1997 1999
2.1 ITQs as Property Rights
In the United States, the resources in a marine ￿shery are deemed ￿common property,￿ which is held in trust by
the government for the community at large. Such resources cannot be transferred to or owned by individuals.
The Magnuson-Stevens Act3 holds that quota shares ￿shall be considered a permit;￿ ￿may be revoked, limited,
or modi￿ed at any time;￿ ￿shall not confer any right of compensation to the holder...if it is revoked, limited, or
modi￿ed;￿ ￿shall not create, or be construed to create, any right, title, or interest in or to any ￿sh before the ￿sh is
harvested by the holder;￿ and ￿shall be considered a grant of permission to the holder of the quota share to engage
in activities permitted by such...quota share.￿
As a result of this insecure property right, there is uncertainty about the future of the program, and holders of
quota shares are generally unable to use their holdings as collateral at banks. 4 As anecdotal evidence, when asked
why this is the case, a ￿sherman in the Red Snapper ￿shery in the Gulf of Mexico stated that ￿we don’t really
own anything. In the legal language, it’s a privilege. There’s always a danger that the government can change its
￿shery policy down the road, and then the quota would be worthless.￿ 5 Another expressed his concern that the
ITQ management would disappear after the ￿ve-year review.
A similar situation exists in Canada. Under Canadian law, ITQ shares are considered a revocable privilege, and
a resistance to ITQs has led to other catch share systems (called Enterprise Allocations) in the Atlantic Provinces.
Although ￿sh are considered ￿Property of the Crown￿ in Canada, in 2008 the Supreme Court ruled that ￿shing quota
States.
3 16 U.S.C. 1801, 1996.
4 This is not due to legal constraints, but rather the bank’s willingness to accept a quota share as collateral.
A recent exception in the United States is the ability of Alaskan ￿shermen to leverage against IFQ holdings with
some Seattle-based banks.
5 Personal communication with Keith ￿Buddy￿ Guindon, April 6, 2009.
5are ￿property￿ for the purposes of the federal Banking and Insolvency Act 6. ITQs are in place in several ￿sheries in
British Columbia (see Table 1), but restrictions on trading were cited as a constraint on potential e￿ciency gains in
the halibut ￿shery. That is, ￿substantial long-run gains in e￿ciency can be jeopardized by preexisting regulations
and the bundling of the property right to the capital stock￿ (Grafton, Squires, and Fox, pg. 679).
In New Zealand, explicit property rights are established in the creation of ITQs, and over the past 25 years
nearly all commercial ￿sheries have shifted to ITQ management. The right to a share of the catch is held in
perpetuity, and when a program is discontinued, or where the allocation is changed by the regulator, ￿shers are
entitled to ￿nancial compensation. Indeed, in the initial allocation of quota under the Quota Management System
(QMS), allocations were in terms of tonnes, and the TAC was ￿xed. When ￿shery managers subsequently decided
to lower the TAC, quota were bought back in an expensive scheme. 7 This buyback will be discussed further and
leveraged in the empirical strategy in Section 5. A list of the ITQ ￿sheries studied in this paper is found in Table
2.
3 Theoretical Background
Economic theory allows us to examine the value of secure property rights by using information inherent in the
relationship between lease and sales prices of quota shares. 8 In a competitive market the lease price of an ITQ
should be equal to the expected economic rents from the current year. The lease price is given by pit = Et(rit cit),
where rit represents the revenues and cit represents the economic costs in ￿shery i and year t; the expectation
operator, Et, simply re￿ects the fact that revenue and cost need not be known with certainty for this simple
analysis to apply. The sales price of an ITQ asset will capitalize the expected discounted rent streams. If rights





If the ￿shery is operating in steady state, expected costs and revenues are constant over time. Then the ratio
of the current lease price to sales price of an ITQ can be written compactly as
pi0
i0 = 
1+. This ratio is commonly
used in ￿nance to test future expectations about earnings, to compare measures of asset value across geographically
distinct markets, and to test for bubbles in asset markets (see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1988 and Cochrane, 1991).
In that literature, it is referred to as the dividend price ratio, to which we will conform here. Under the simple
6 Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada 2008 SCC 58.
7 For a detailed overview of the history of the Quota Management System, see Rees, 2005.
8 A famous application of this type of reasoning is in Fogel and Engerman (1974), who examine slave price trends
leading up to the end of the Civil War.
6Table 2: New Zealand ITQ Fisheries in the Analysis
Common Name QMS First Migratory Illegal
Code Year Species Harvests
Freshwater Eel ANG 2000
Barracouta BAR 1986
Blue Cod BCO 1986
Bigeye Tuna BIG 2004 Yes
Bluenose BNS 1986
Butter￿sh BUT 2002
Blue Shark BWS 2004 Yes
Alfonsino BYX 1986
Black Cardinal￿sh CDL 1998
Spiny Lobster CRA 1990 Yes
Elephant Fish ELE 1986




Green-lipped Mussel GLM 2004
Grey Mullet GMU 1986 Yes
Giant Spider Crab GSC 2005
Dark Ghost Shark GSH 1998
Pale Ghost Shark GSP 1998
Red Gurnard GUR 1986
Hake HAK 1986 Yes
Hoki HOK 1986
Groper HPB 1986
John Dory JDO 1986
Jack Mackerels JMA 1987
Kahawai KAH 2004
King￿sh KIN 2003
Lookdown Dory LDO 2004
Leatherjacket LEA 2003
Freshwater Eel LFE 2004
Ling LIN 1986
Mako Shark MAK 2004 Yes
Blue Moki MOK 1986
Moon￿sh MOO 2004 Yes
Oreo OEO 1986
Orange Roughy ORH 1986
Dredge Oyster OYS 1996
Nelson/Marlborough
Dredge Oyster OYU 1997 Yes
Foveaux Strait
Table continued on next page.
7Table 2 Continued
Common Name QMS First Migratory Illegal
Code Year Species Harvests
Paddle Crab PAD 2002
Parore PAR 2004
Paua PAU 1987 Yes
Pilchard PIL 2002
Porae POR 2004
Porbeagle Shark POS 2004 Yes
Ray’s Bream RBM 2004 Yes
Ruby￿sh RBY 1998
Red Cod RCO 1986
Ribaldo RIB 1998
Rough Skate RSK 2003
Red Snapper RSN 2004
Southern Blue Whiting SBW 1999
Scallops coromandel SCA 1992
School Shark SCH 1986
Freshwater Eel SFE 2004
Gem￿sh SKI 1986
Snapper SNA 1986 Yes
Spiny Dog￿sh SPD 2004
Sea Perch SPE 1998
Rig SPO 1986 Yes
Arrow Squid SQU 1987
Smooth Skate SSK 2003
Stargazer STA 1986
Southern Blue￿n Tuna STN 2004 Yes Yes
Kina SUR 2003
Silver Warehou SWA 1986 Yes
Sword￿sh SWO 2004 Yes
Tarakihi TAR 1986
Paci￿c Blue￿n Tuna TOR 2004 Yes
Trevally TRE 1986
Trumpeter TRU 1998
Blue Warehou WAR 1986 Yes
White Warehou WWA 1998 Yes
Yellow-Eyed Mullet YEM 1998
Yellow￿n Tuna YFN 2004 Yes
Species and species groups in the dataset for New Zealand. First Year denotes the ￿rst year under the Quota
Management System. Highly Migratory is determined by the Ministry of Fisheries. Illegal harvests denotes species
that the Plenary Reports discuss the problem of evidence of illegal harvests for that species.
8model above, the dividend price ratio should be a function of only the discount rate, : In particular, ￿shery speci￿c
characteristics that a￿ect revenues and/or costs conveniently cancel out of the dividend price ratio. 9 However, the
calculus above implies an in￿nitely secure property right.
Suppose instead that participants in the market for quota share in ￿shery i place some non-zero annual proba-
bility, , on the revocation of rights (e.g. the government discontinues the ITQ program or shuts down the ￿shery).
In that case, the lease value remains unchanged, but the sales value (at time 0) is now given by
uncertain
i0 = pi0 +
1 ∑
=1
(1   ) E0[ri   ci]
(1 + ) : (1)
Again, if the ￿shery is in steady state it is straightforward to show that the dividend price ratio is given by:
~ R =
1 +    (1   )
1 + 
: (2)
All else equal, less security about ownership in an ITQ program leads to a predictable e￿ect on the dividend price
ratio, ~ R. Perhaps of more practical signi￿cance, we can solve Equation (2) for the annual revocation probability, :
 = ~ R(1 + )   : (3)
For example, suppose the dividend price ratio is ~ R = 0:15 (a typical value from the ensuing empirical analysis), and
that the relevant discount rate is  = 0:05. These values imply an implied annual revocation probability of about
11%. Instead, if ~ R = 0:10, the annual revocation probability is about 6%. We can use Equation (3) to tease apart
the implied strength of property rights in two di￿erent ￿sheries with the same . The di￿erence between annual
revocation probabilities in ￿sheries i and j are given by:
i   j = (1 + )( ~ Ri   ~ Rj); (4)
which provides a convenient means to compare property rights strength across ￿sheries.
In cases where ownership of an ITQ is considered a privilege and is not guaranteed in perpetuity, the sales price
would be lower, while the lease price would remain unchanged. Similarly, if exclusivity of the right to a share of
the TAC is attenuated by ￿shery-speci￿c characteristics, ~ R would be high. All else equal, ~ R should be lower where
property rights are secure.
9 A result that will become useful in our empirical speci￿cation.
9The goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis that strong property rights lead to a lower dividend price ratio in
the context of renewable resources. Using sales and lease prices from countries with varying strengths of property
rights, we ￿rst test for di￿erences in the dividend price ratio across countries. In that analysis we attempt to
control for other di￿erences across countries and ￿sheries and we leverage the insight that the dividend price ratio
di￿erences out ￿shery speci￿c variables that might a￿ect asset values. We then focus on di￿erences in dividend price
ratios within countries, examining how ￿shermen implicitly perceive the future value of quota holdings. Because
ITQ programs are generally subject to federal laws that de￿ne catch shares, it is di￿cult to obtain within-country
heterogeneity in property rights security. 10 For within-country evidence, we exploit variation in the exclusivity
of the property right across ￿sheries resulting from enforcement of the property right (illegal harvesting) and
neighboring jurisdictions that arise due to biological characteristics (migratory species). Furthermore, we exploit
a policy shock to look for evidence that discounting behavior changed in quota markets following a high-pro￿le
buyback.
4 Data Description
We have compiled a unique panel dataset spanning hundreds of ITQ ￿sheries in three countries. The primary
variables of interest involve ITQ share sales and lease prices. Because data on individual transactions are generally
not available, we use annual average prices for sales and leases of quota shares in three countries: Canada, the
United States, and New Zealand. Variables that can a￿ect the price of quota shares include the total allowable
catch (TAC), ex-vessel prices, the market interest rate, and biological characteristics of the species. A detailed
description of the data sources is available from the authors.
Data from New Zealand are the most comprehensive and come from FishServe, the New Zealand Seafood
Industry Council, and the Ministry of Fisheries. For each species under quota management and for each management
area, we have average annual prices for sales and leases, average greenweight tonnage prices, 11 the total allowable
commercial catch, and biological data from the Ministry of Fisheries and FishBase. 12
10 There is some variation within the United States in how catch shares have been implemented by regional
management councils, but due to data limitations, we focus our attention on New Zealand.
11 In New Zealand, ex-vessel prices are not available for the entire time period. Following Newell et al (2005), we
calculate greenweight tonnage prices using export price data for each year, and conversion factors from Clement
and Associates.
12 In consultation with FishServe, a small number of observations are omitted from the analysis because they are
believed to contain signi￿cant errors. Including these observations does not qualitatively change our results.
10Canadian quota prices are from management reports, Department of Fisheries and Oceans consulting reports
from Nelson Bros., and Individual Fishing Quota reports from Munro & Associates. Canadian ￿sheries included in
the analysis are British Columbian halibut, sable￿sh coastwide hake, gulf hake, arrowtooth ￿ounder, and ￿uncut￿
ground￿sh, all of which operate under an ITQ.
Finally, United States data come from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and regional management
councils. Fisheries under ITQ management included in the analysis are the Alaskan Halibut and Sable￿sh, the
Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper, and the Virginia Striped Bass ￿shery. 13
As an introduction to the data, consider a simple graph of the median ~ R across time for New Zealand, Canada,
and the United States (Figure 1). While this simple graph fails to control for other factors (e.g. the interest
rate, ￿shery characteristics), it suggests there might be a systematic di￿erence across countries. The median ~ R in
New Zealand always falls below that of the United States, and typically falls below that of Canada. Furthermore
Canada’s median ~ R is typically below that of the United States. This graphical evidence is consistent with our
theory and descriptive accounts that property rights are most secure in New Zealand, somewhat less secure in
Canada, and substantially less secure in the United States. The spike in 2007 for the United States includes only
the ￿rst year of ITQs in the Red Snapper ￿shery. In 2008, both the Red Snapper and Virginia Striped Bass are
included. These ratios tend to be signi￿cantly larger than US halibut and sable￿sh, which are included in earlier
years in the ￿gure.14 In New Zealand, there is a downward trend from the ￿rst year of the Quota Management
System (QMS) until present. The median ratio in the ￿rst year of the program was about 15%, whereas that rate
in 2008 was near 8%. As is clear from Equation 2, the interest rate appears to play a key role in determining this
ratio.
It is useful to further motivate our approach with an anecdote. Consider two similar ￿sheries in the United
States and New Zealand: the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper ￿shery, and the New Zealand Snapper (SNA) ￿shery.
The Snapper ￿shery in New Zealand was ￿rst put under quota management in 1986, and the median ~ R for that
species group for the ￿rst three years of the program (a period of extremely high interest rates) was about 17%,
and over the entire series the median ~ R is about 8.8%. On the other hand, the Red Snapper ￿shery in the Gulf of
Mexico had a mean ~ R of about 27% during the ￿rst two years of the ITQ program. Though biologically similar, the
implicit revocation probability in the Red Snapper ￿shery is much higher, anecdotally supporting our hypothesis
13 At this time, data from the Alaskan Crab ￿shery are not available. Furthermore, we are unaware of any data
on quota prices in the Atlantic Surf Clam / Ocean Quahog ￿shery.
14 Data for Alaskan Halibut and Sable￿sh ITQs leases are not available past 2006.








































Figure 1: Median dividend price ratios for New Zealand, Canada, and United States.
that weaker property rights raise the dividend price ratio. Of course, a host of factors could a￿ect ~ R, which we
consider in the following section.
In Figure 2 for each New Zealand species under ITQ management we show a scatter plot of the sales and lease
prices of quota since 2002. 15 The graph is arranged as follows. Each dot represents the median lease and median
sales value (in 2008 NZ dollars) for a particular New Zealand species under ITQ management between 2002 and
2008. Species above and to the left have higher dividend price ratios, ~ R. We distinguish between stocks with high
illegal take (upward triangle), highly migratory stocks (downward triangle), and other stocks (open circle). The
mean ~ R for the latter category is about 8%, and is graphed by the lower line. The mean ~ R for the former categories
is about 12% and is graphed by the upper line. While this simple graphical illustration fails to account for other
factors which a￿ect sales and lease prices of ￿sheries quota, it is suggestive of the intra-country e￿ects of property
rights strength. Species with high illegal catches and/or are highly migratory have less exlusive property rights,
and they tend to have higher ratios. The importance of exclusivity of property rights will be discussed further in
15 Newell, Sanchirico and Kerr (2005) provide similar plots in their study, but focus on market functionality and









































As described above, there is substantial variation in the property rights underlying ITQs across countries. It may be
possible to qualitatively describe each property right characteristic for each ￿shery, but comparing these property
rights characteristics across ￿sheries and countries is di￿cult. Here we take a more agnostic approach, estimating
reduced-form equations to test for systematic di￿erences in property rights across countries. We augment our data
set and attempt to carefully control for relevant ￿shery- and country-speci￿c characteristics. Once again, we make
use of the observation that by dividing lease price by sales price, the dividend price ratio washes away many ￿shery
and country speci￿c factors that a￿ect the value of the ￿shery.
The dependent variable throughout this section is the dividend price ratio of ITQs, ~ R.16 We exploit the panel-
16 This variable was constructed using average annual sales and lease prices, which may introduce some measure-
13structure of the data and estimate country ￿xed-e￿ects, which we use to test the null hypothesis that there is no
systematic di￿erence in dividend price ratios across countries. We estimate several equations, including controls
for market conditions, biological characteristics, ￿xed e￿ects for species groups, and year ￿xed e￿ects to control for
time-varying unobservables.
The most basic speci￿cation regresses ~ R on country ￿xed e￿ects, species group ￿xed e￿ects, 17 and the market
interest rate (in this case that country’s 5-year Treasury rate in that year). The results are in column (1) of Table
3. The results suggest that, on average, ~ R in the United States is about 5.7 percentage points larger than in New
Zealand. ~ R in Canada is also signi￿cantly larger than in New Zealand, and the di￿erence between the United
States and Canada is signi￿cant. In the second speci￿cation (column 2), we add year ￿xed e￿ects to control for
unobserved contemporaneous shocks. 18 In this case, the ratio in the United States is about eight points higher
than in New Zealand.
Clearly there are other factors that could in￿uence the sales price of quota shares that are not included in the
stylized model presented above. Expectations about the future harvest and ex-vessel prices would dictate future
pro￿tability, and hence quota sales prices. We attempt to control for these expectations by including trends for
harvest and ex-vessel prices. Speci￿cally, we control for the percentage change of this year’s harvest from last year
(in that ￿shery), and the percentage change of this year’s average ex-vessel price from last year.
Although species group ￿xed e￿ects are included in every speci￿cation, we alo add biological characteristics
of each ￿shery, which could in￿uence the horizon over which stocks rebuild. We control for years to maturity,
length at maturity, and the maximum age of a species. Inclusion of these variables does not a￿ect the main results,
perhaps unsurprisingly because there is little variation in these variables within ISSCAAP species groups. Finally,
the dynamics of a ratio within a ￿shery over time suggest that the ratio of lease to sales prices decrease with the
tenure of an ITQ program. For each ￿shery, we include the number of years since the ￿rst year of ITQ management.
We also include a quadratic term to account for nonlinear relationships, and each of these variables is interacted
with country ￿xed e￿ects to allow this e￿ect to vary across countries. In column (3), conditional on the control
ment error into our dependent variable. Because our data are on an annual basis, we cannot take into account
intra-year ￿uctuations in lease or sales prices. Furthermore, because we are not constructing the ratio from individ-
ual transactions, we cannot observe whether any outliers (which may not represent arms-length transactions, for
example) are included. To the extent that any measurement error is random (and uncorrelated with the independent
variables), our estimates will be unbiased.
17 We use ISSCAAP species group classi￿cations to hold constant species-speci￿c e￿ects; there are 18 groups in
the baseline speci￿cation.
18 The results are robust to the inclusion of a quadratic function of interest rates.
14variables, the ratio in the United States is about 11 points larger than in New Zealand. In Canada, the point
estimate indicates that the dividend price ratio is nearly seven points larger than in New Zealand.
As discussed above, New Zealand’s Quota Management System includes many species not managed by ITQs
in the United States or Canada. In column (4), we restrict the sample to include only New Zealand species with
￿comparable￿ counterparts in the United States or Canada. Speci￿cally, we restrict the sample to include only
species in ISSCAAP groups 25, 31, 32, 33 or 34. These results are shown in column (4) of Table 3. In this case,
the point estimate implies that the dividend price ratio in the United States is thirteen points higher than in New
Zealand.
Our cross-country results suggest that the dividend price ratio of ITQs is signi￿cantly higher in the United
States and Canada, where property rights governing ITQs are relatively weak. Rather than picking up the desired
e￿ect of property rights security, these results could be re￿ecting a higher risk of collapse in US and Canadian
￿sheries. While we have no empirical or anecdotal evidence that this is the case, we can test for it in our analysis.
In columns (5) and (6) we include a dummy variable for stock collapse; our results are robust to the inclusion of
this variable, as well as alternative de￿nitions of collapse or measures for the health of the stock. 19 In column (6),
our preferred speci￿cation, the dividend price ratio in Canada is about seven points higher than in New Zealand,
and that ratio in the United States is nearly 14 points higher than in New Zealand.
The cross-country regression results suggest that ITQ ￿sheries in the United States have a signi￿cantly higher
~ R. The ratio in the United States is higher than in Canada, which, in turn, is higher than New Zealand, though the
results for Canada are not robust across speci￿cations. Because we are controlling for ￿shery-speci￿c characteristics
and market factors, we argue that property rights strength explain the di￿erence in dividend price ratios across
these countries.20 In the next section we examine within-country evidence.
19 Speci￿cally, we include an indicator variable equaling one if the stock is below ten percent of historical harvest
levels, a common measure of ￿shery ￿collapse￿ developed by ecologists (Worm et al. 2006).
20 Our results are robust to a variety of additional controls, including ￿shery collapse, revenue volatility, and
quadratic functions of the control variables. Our results are also insensitive to inclusion of ￿xed e￿ects for year
or ISSCAAP category. Furthermore, when estimating these regressions excluding the Red Snapper and Virginia
Striped Bass ￿sheries (both of which have very high dividend price ratios), the di￿erence between the United States





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.2.1 Migratory Species and Exclusivity
For within-country evidence, we examine more closely the data from New Zealand. While property rights char-
acteristics such as disposition, use, and possession do not vary signi￿cantly across ￿sheries within New Zealand,
there is substantial variation in exclusivity. This variation is not policy-induced, but rather is a function of the
characteristics of the species. While some species do not move signi￿cantly across space, several highly migratory
species move in and out of New Zealand waters, where they are subject to ￿shing pressure outside the control of
the Quota Management System.
New Zealand waters contain tunas and other large pelagic species that migrate long distances seasonally, often
outside of the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone, into unmanaged international waters or into the waters of other
jurisdictions. These species are characterized as ￿highly migratory.￿ 21 Because highly migratory species are subject
to ￿shing pressure that is unregulated by New Zealand’s quota management system, the exclusivity of the ITQ
right is arguably weaker than for species that stay within New Zealand’s waters. This property right insecurity is
driven by poor (or no) management in neighboring waters.
Our empirical approach formalizes the casual observation from Figure 2 that highly migratory species tend to
have higher ~ R. Table 4 provides within-country estimates for New Zealand. In these speci￿cations we are able to
control for a host of factors, including 5-year Treasury yields, trends for catch and greenweight prices, 22 time to
maturity, length at maturity, maximum age, ￿shery type (inshore, o￿shore, or shell￿sh) 23 and whether or not the
Ministry characterizes a species as recreationally or customarily ￿signi￿cant.￿ In addition, we control for stock-
speci￿c revenue volatility, which captures both inter-annual ￿uctuations in total harvest and product prices. In
column (2) we include year ￿xed e￿ects instead of the interest rate. Depending on the control variables included,
~ R is between 0.8 and 1.1 percentage points higher for highly migratory species, supporting our hypothesis of the
e￿ects of property rights strength on the dividend price ratio.
21 In Table 2, the fourth column indicates whether each species is classi￿ed as highly migratory.
22 New Zealand’s ￿sh production constitutes less than one percent of worldwide production, and exports (in terms
of value) make up about two percent of overall international trade in ￿sh products. Some stocks, however, are
large on a worldwide basis. In these ￿sheries the ex-vessel price is arguably endogenous. While we do not have a
plausible instrument for ex-vessel prices, in alternative speci￿cations (available from the authors) we exclude these
￿sheries. All of our results are robust to the exclusion of these ￿sheries from the analysis.
23 In this speci￿cation we do not include ISSCAAP category ￿xed e￿ects because they are highly collinear with
the indicator for Highly Migratory Species. When included, though, the species group ￿xed e￿ects that include
highly migratory species are jointly signi￿cant.
175.2.2 Illegal Harvest and Insecure Property Rights
Evidence of illegal harvests in some stocks would suggest a weaker property right due to lack of enforcement. For
each commercial species in the Quota Management System in New Zealand, the 2008 Plenary Report from the
Ministry of Fisheries discusses any known evidence of illegal harvests. Of the 75 species with su￿cient data for
the analysis here, there are six instances where signi￿cant illegal takes are believed to occur. If ￿shermen are also
aware that some ￿sh are illegally harvested from these stocks, it is plausible that they would place a lower value
on the future value of quota holdings. In Table 4, we also include an indicator variable equal to one if that species
has been prone to illegal harvesting. The point estimates suggest that these stocks have dividend price ratios that
are around three percentage points larger than for similar stocks.
5.2.3 Quota Buybacks and the Treaty of Waitangi
Finally, several policy changes in New Zealand between 1989 and 1992 may plausibly have impacted beliefs about
ITQ security within New Zealand. In 1986, the initial allocations in the QMS system were in terms of tonnes,
rather than as a percentage of the annual total allowable catch. When it became clear that the initial allocation
was too high for many stocks, the Ministry of Fisheries proceeded to rede￿ne the right as a percentage of the total
allowable catch.24 After much debate, the government honored the property rights by issuing a buyback of quota
where the initial allocation was too high. As quotas were relatively new in New Zealand (and around the world),
this action by the government likely served as a signal that it would treat quotas as legal assets. The buybacks
began in 1989 and were ￿nalized in the next two years.
Around the same time, there was a debate about how the Maori people, native New Zealanders, were being
treated under the QMS system. The Maori people had traditionally relied on the ocean’s resources, and there was a
concern that the quota system did not take into account the signi￿cance of the ￿sheries to them. Since the inception
of the QMS program, there was much controversy and dispute surrounding the treatment of native people under
the ￿sheries management regime. In 1992 there were concessions citing the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, in which the
Maori people were allocated 20% of the TAC for some key stocks. This policy decision formalized the government’s
position and removed substantial uncertainty about the future of property rights in New Zealand ￿sheries. We
argue that this further strengthened security and would thus be expected to decrease the dividend price ratio. In
column (3) of Table 4, we estimate a regression with the same controls as in column (1), but also including an
24 This approach has since been adopted by nearly all countries.
18Table 4: Within-Country Evidence: New Zealand Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Highly Migratory Species 0.0081* 0.0111** 0.0079*
(0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Extensive Illegal Harvest 0.0300*** 0.0293*** 0.0310***
(0.0073) (0.0072) (0.0075)
Revenue Volatility 0.0097 0.0159* 0.0104
(0.0087) (0.0090) (0.0085)
Highly Signi￿cant Spp. -0.0074 -0.0106** -0.0089*
(0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0047)
5 Year Treasury Rate 0.3851*** -0.0545
(0.0993) (0.1679)
Pct Change in Harvest -0.0015 0.0010 -0.0006
(0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0046)
Pct Change in Ex-Vessel Price 0.0014 -0.0068 0.0037
(0.0091) (0.0096) (0.0091)
Age at Maturity 0.0013* 0.0013** 0.0013*
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Length at Maturity -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)




Year Fixed E￿ects No Yes No
The dependent variable is the ratio of the average lease price to the average sales price of quota in a management
area. There are 992 observations in each regression. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses, and
***, ** and * denote signi￿cance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Each speci￿cation also includes
￿type￿ ￿xed e￿ects, corresponding to o￿shore, inshore and shell￿sh (freshwater excluded), as well as the time trends
for number of years (and years squared) since an individual ￿shery has been managed by ITQs. Revenue volatility
is calculated as the standard deviation in real total revenue for that ￿shery over all years in our dataset.
indicator variable that equals one for all years including 1992 and thereafter. The point estimate suggests that
post-reforms there was a four percentage point decrease in the average dividend price ratio, controlling for interest
rates and ￿shery-speci￿c characteristics.
5.2.4 Summary
The results within New Zealand provide further empirical evidence that the security of property rights a￿ects
quota asset values. Fisheries within New Zealand are governed by federal legislation, so we look to other sources of
variation to test whether the security of property rights a￿ects dividend price ratios of quota shares. While other
factors are clearly important, such as market interest rates and the volatility of revenues for that ￿shery, factors
that strengthen or attenuate the security of property rights a￿ect quota asset values. We ￿nd strong evidence of
a pecuniary e￿ect of property rights strength, which suggests that the design of these institutions plays a critical
role.
196 Conclusion
This paper provides the ￿rst empirical evidence that stronger property rights lead to higher asset values and lower
dividend price ratios ( ~ R) in ITQ ￿sheries. Our cross-country evidence is based on descriptive accounts of ITQs
as property rights in New Zealand, Canada and the United States. In our cross-country regressions, the point
estimates suggest that ~ R for quota in the United States is nearly twice as large as in New Zealand. The average ~ R
for quota in Canada is larger than in New Zealand in some speci￿cations, but these results are not as robust. Our
estimates are consistent with the general view that ITQs as property rights are more secure in New Zealand than
in North American ￿sheries.
We then exploit important di￿erences in the exclusivity of property rights within New Zealand to test whether
stronger rights lead to lower dividend price ratios. Where the exclusivity of the catch share is limited by migratory
species or illegal harvesting, ~ R is signi￿cantly higher than other similar ￿sheries, even when controlling for biological
and other ￿shery-speci￿c characteristics. This lends insight into the importance of strong property rights, but also
suggests that coordination across jurisdictions and better enforcement of these property rights might lead to lower
implicit discount rates and greater quota asset values.
Several caveats should be mentioned. First, across countries, we cannot quantify the e￿ects of component
characteristics of property rights on asset values. Instead, we rely on country ￿xed-e￿ects and dummy variables to
capture di￿erences in property rights security across ￿sheries. However, our focus on ￿sheries and the use of the
dividend price ratio allows us to isolate the e￿ect of country-speci￿c institutions on investment in common pool
resources. Second, our cross-country results could be consistent with systematic di￿erences in the probability of
￿shery collapse across countries. To attempt to rule out this possibility, we control for trends in harvest and ex-
vessel prices in our main speci￿cations and we control for whether an individual ￿shery was ￿collapsed￿ in any given
year. Our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for the state of the ￿sh stock as well as market conditions
and trends, but, as in any cross-country regression, other unobserved heterogeneity may still be in￿uencing our
results. Third, our cross-country results could be consistent with credit constraints and non-collateralizable assets.
The dividend price ratio could be higher in the United States because of credit constraints and the inability to
secure a loan for ITQ shares. This would simply be a mechanism through which insecure property rights a￿ect asset
prices. Finally, our results suggest that there is a pecuniary e￿ect of property rights security, and if this result is
present elsewhere (such as capital investment) the security of property rights are critical to ￿sheries management.
20On the other hand, if the only impact of property rights security is through quota asset values then the impact on
social welfare is unclear, though the security of property rights would clearly a￿ect the distribution of wealth.
Rights-based management in ￿sheries can lead to signi￿cant economic gains by eliminating the race to ￿sh
and providing private incentives to steward the resource. Our results suggest that stronger property rights lead to
greater quota asset values. A closely related question concerns how property rights strength will a￿ect di￿erent
dimensions of investment in common pool resources (e.g. physical capital, environmental recovery, etc.). Indeed,
these changes in investment may be partially responsible for the changes in asset values we observe. One implication
may be that weak property rights decrease the incentive for good stewardship of the resource by increasing the
average implicit discount rate in ￿sheries. While we can only speculate on the underlying mechanisms, we hope
that this research will help motivate future work on the e￿ects of property rights security on the management,
biological status, and sustainability of the resource itself.
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